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The U.S. Supreme Court and lower state and federal courts 
continue to decide cases under the Federal Arbitration Act 
(“FAA”)1 at an astounding rate.  This chapter summarizes 
Supreme Court opinions over the past year that interpret the FAA, 
as well as selected lower court decisions that apply the FAA and 
could have an impact on securities arbitration practice.2 
 
I. U.S. Supreme Court  
 
 Since last summer when I authored the Arbitration Law 
Update 2012 for PLI, the United States Supreme Court decided 
one new arbitration case and heard oral argument on two other 
cases.3 
 
A. Separability doctrine 
  
 In November 2012, the Supreme Court issued a per 
curiam opinion in Nitro-Lift Technologies, L.L.C. v. Howard,4 
holding that the FAA preempted a decision by the Supreme Court 
of Oklahoma to rule, in the first instance, on the validity of a 
covenant not to compete despite the existence of an arbitration 
clause.  
 
 Nitro-Lift Technologies, a provider of services to 
operators of oil and gas wells, entered into confidentiality and 
noncompetition agreements with two of its employees, 
Respondents Howard and Schneider.5 Those agreements contained 
                                                 
1 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (2013).   
2 Because securities arbitration necessarily “involves commerce” (FAA § 
2), courts apply the FAA to issues arising out of securities arbitrations.  
See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002). 
3 I will provide updates on these two cases at the program, as they are 
likely to be decided after this chapter is submitted for publication but 
before the date of the program.  
4 133 S.Ct. 500 (2012). 
5 Id. at 501-02. 
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a broad arbitration clause, delegating to an arbitrator “[a]ny 
dispute, difference or unresolved question between Nitro–Lift and 
the Employee[s].”6  When the employees quit Nitro-Lift and 
started working for competitors, Nitro-Lift demanded arbitration, 
alleging breach of the noncompetition agreements.7   
 
 Respondents filed suit in state court in Oklahoma, asking 
the court to declare the noncompetition agreements unenforceable 
under an Oklahoma statute that limits the enforceability of 
covenants not to compete.8  The trial court dismissed the 
complaint, concluding the dispute was arbitrable.  On appeal, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that, in Oklahoma, courts decide 
the enforceability of noncompetition agreements, thus ignoring the 
arbitration clause.  The Oklahoma high court then declared the 
noncompetition agreements unenforceable as against public 
policy.9  
 
 Nitro-Lift appealed to the U.S Supreme Court.  The Court 
ruled that the Oklahoma high court blatantly and improperly 
ignored the FAA separability doctrine, which declares that 
arbitrators decide in the first instance the enforceability of 
                                                 
6 Id. at 502.    
7 Id. 
8 Id.  15 Okl.St.Ann. § 219A (2012) provides:  
A. A person who makes an agreement with an employer, 
whether in writing or verbally, not to compete with the employer 
after the employment relationship has been terminated, shall be 
permitted to engage in the same business as that conducted by 
the former employer or in a similar business as that conducted 
by the former employer as long as the former employee does not 
directly solicit the sale of goods, services or a combination of 
goods and services from the established customers of the former 
employer. 
B. Any provision in a contract between an employer and an 
employee in conflict with the provisions of this section shall be 
void and unenforceable. 
9 133 S.Ct at 502. 
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contracts containing a pre-dispute arbitration clause, as long as the 
challenge is not to the arbitration clause itself.10  In vacating the 
decision, the Court harshly reprimanded the Oklahoma high court:  
 
State courts rather than federal courts are most frequently 
called upon to apply the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 
U.S.C. § 1 et seq., including the Act's national policy 
favoring arbitration. It is a matter of great importance, 
therefore, that state supreme courts adhere to a correct 
interpretation of the legislation. Here, the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court failed to do so. By declaring the 
noncompetition agreements in two employment contracts 
null and void, rather than leaving that determination to the 
arbitrator in the first instance, the state court ignored a 
basic tenet of the Act's substantive arbitration law.11 
 
 In the end, while the Supreme Court harshly rebuked the 
Oklahoma high court, Nitro-Lift offers no new law: it just 
reiterates and reaffirms fundamental principles of the Court’s FAA 
jurisprudence, including doctrines of broad FAA preemption, 
separability, and the power of the arbitrators to decide the 
enforceability of contracts containing an arbitration clause. 
 
B. Vindication of statutory rights 
 
 Also in November 2012, the Supreme Court granted the 
petition for a writ of certiorari in American Express Co. v. Italian 
Colors Restaurant,12 to decide the following question presented: 
“Whether the Federal Arbitration Act permits courts, invoking the 
‘federal substantive law of arbitrability,’ to invalidate arbitration 
                                                 
10 See Buckeye Check Cashing Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 446 
(2006).   
11 Nitro-Lift, 133 S.Ct at 501.   
12 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Amex III”), cert. granted, 133 S.Ct. 594 
(2012). 
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agreements on the ground that they do not permit class arbitration 
of a federal-law claim.”13  
  
 In Amex III, the Second Circuit ruled that a pre-dispute 
arbitration clause containing a class action waiver in merchants’ 
credit card processing agreements was unenforceable because it 
precluded plaintiff merchants from vindicating their statutory 
rights under the federal antitrust laws.14  Amex III was the third 
time the Second Circuit had found that arbitration clause 
unenforceable under the “vindicating rights” doctrine, this last time 
even after a review of the case in light of the Supreme Court’s 
April 2011 decision in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion.15 
 
The Court of Appeals reconsidered, in light of AT&T 
Mobility, its prior decisions16 that a class action waiver clause in a 
                                                 
13 American Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari, 2012 WL 3091064, *i (U.S. July 30, 2012). 
14 667 F.3d at 219.  Under the “vindicating statutory rights” doctrine 
derived from the Supreme Court’s pronouncement that “so long as the 
prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action 
in the arbitral forum, the [federal] statute [providing that cause of action] 
will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function” 
(Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
637 (1985)), a disputant can argue that an arbitration agreement is 
unenforceable because an unfair aspect of the arbitration process would 
preclude that party from vindicating its statutory rights.  Id. at 637; see 
also Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000) 
(recognizing in dicta that, if a party showed that pursuing its statutory 
claims through arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, and thus it 
could not vindicate its statutory rights, a court could validly refuse to 
enforce a pre-dispute arbitration agreement). 
15 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011) (enforcing class action waiver in consumer 
services arbitration agreement and preempting state law of 
unconscionability). 
16 See In Re American Exp. Merch. Litig., 634 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(“Amex II”); In Re American Exp. Merch. Litig., 554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 
2009) (“Amex I”).  The Court of Appeals reconsidered Amex I in light of 
the Supreme Court’s subsequent ruling in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds Intern. Corp, 559 U.S. 662, 130 S.Ct. 1758 (2010). 
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merchants’ credit card agreement was unenforceable under the 
FAA because “enforcement of the clause would effectively 
preclude any action seeking to vindicate the [plaintiffs’] statutory 
rights.”17  The Court of Appeals found that AT&T Mobility did not 
alter its prior analysis, which rested on a different ground than that 
of AT&T Mobility.18  Rather, the Court of Appeals recognized, 
“[h]ere…our holding rests squarely on a ‘vindication of statutory 
rights analysis, which is part of the federal substantive law of 
arbitrability.’”19  Because plaintiffs in this case demonstrated 
through expert testimony that pursuing their statutory claims 
individually as opposed to through class arbitration would not be 
economically feasible, “effectively depriving plaintiffs of the 
statutory protections of the antitrust laws,”20 the Court of Appeals 
directed the district court to deny defendant’s motion to compel 
arbitration.21 
 
 The Court heard oral argument on February 27, 2013.  
Since the “vindicating rights” doctrine seemed one of the only 
valid exceptions to AT&T Mobility’s broad preemption of state 
unconscionability law as applied to class action waivers, the 
AMEX III decision will surely be the most important arbitration 
law case coming out of the Court this term.  Most scholars who 
listened to the argument or read the transcript predict that the Court 
will rule in favor of American Express on the grounds that 
                                                 
17 Amex I, 554 F.3d at 304. 
18 Amex III, 667 F.3d at 214 (“What Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion do not 
do is require that all class-action waivers be deemed per se enforceable.  
That leaves open the question presented on this appeal: whether a 
mandatory class action waiver clause is enforceable even if the plaintiffs 
are able to demonstrate that the practical effect of enforcement would be 
to preclude their ability to bring federal antitrust claims.”). 
19 Id. at 213, citing Amex I, 554 F.3d at 320. 
20 Id. at 217. 
21 Id. at 219.  But see Homa v. American Exp. Co., 494 Fed. Appx. 191, 
196-98 (3d Cir. 2012) (enforcing class action waiver and rejecting 
“vindicating rights” challenge). 
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plaintiffs’ claim that they will not be able to vindicate their 
statutory rights under the antitrust laws is too speculative.22 
 
C. Class arbitration 
 
 Only a few weeks after granting certiorari in Amex III, the 
Court agreed to hear another FAA-related case, Oxford Health 
Plans LLC v. Sutter.23  Sutter follows on the heels of the Court’s 
2010 decision in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.,24 
which held that courts must construe an arbitration agreement that 
is truly “silent” as to class arbitration to mean that the parties did 
not authorize arbitrators to conduct class arbitration.   
 
 In Stolt-Nielsen, the Court found that the arbitration panel 
had “exceeded their powers” within the meaning of FAA §10(a)(4) 
by reading into a silent arbitration agreement the parties’ intent to 
arbitrate aggregable claims.  Notably, however, the parties in Stolt-
Nielsen “stipulated that there was ‘no agreement’ on the issue of 
class-action arbitration.”25  As a result, the Court conceded that it 
had “no occasion to decide what contractual basis may support a 
finding that the parties agreed to authorize class-action 
arbitration.”26    
 
 The arbitrator in Sutter also interpreted a “silent” 
arbitration clause to allow class arbitration, but in this case the 
parties had not stipulated as to their intention with respect to class 
arbitration, so the arbitrator had to discern the parties’ intentions.27  
                                                 
22 See, e.g., Sarah Cole, American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant 
Oral Argument Report, ADR Law Prof Blog (Feb. 27, 2013), 
http://www.indisputably.org/?p=4382. 
23 675 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S.Ct. 786 (2012). 
24 559 U.S. 662, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
25 130 S.Ct. at 1776 n.10. 
26 Id. 
27 The Sutter clause provided:  
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The arbitrator, in his written order, “[f]ram[ed] the question as one 
of contract construction,” and described the parties’ arbitration 
clause as “’much broader even than the usual broad arbitration 
clause;’ it was ‘unique in [his] experience and seem[ed] to be 
drafted to be as broad as can be.”28  The arbitrator concluded that 
the broad language of “[n]o civil action” in the clause “embrace[d] 
all conceivable court actions, including class actions” and the 
clause’s second phrase sent “all such disputes” to arbitration.29  
Thus, he reasoned, “the clause expressed the parties’ intent to 
authorize class arbitration ‘on its face.’”30 
 
 The district court and ultimately the Third Circuit 
confirmed the arbitrator’s ruling.  The Third Circuit reasoned that 
Stolt-Nielsen “did not establish a bright line rule that class 
arbitration is allowed only under an arbitration agreement that 
incants ‘class arbitration’ or otherwise expressly provides for 
aggregable procedures.”31  Rather, the case established a “default 
rule” that, “[a]bsent a contractual basis for finding that the parties 
agreed to class arbitration, an arbitration award ordering that 
procedure exceeds the arbitrator’s powers and will be subject to 
vacatur under §10(a)(4).32 
 
 The Supreme Court heard oral argument on March 25, 
2013.  The Justices’ questions crystallized the tension between the 
two competing policies at stake in this case:  should courts defer to 
                                                                                                    
‘No civil action concerning any dispute arising under this 
Agreement shall be instituted before any court, and all such 
disputes shall be submitted to final and binding arbitration in 
New Jersey, pursuant to the Rules of the American Arbitration 
Association with one arbitrator.’ 
675 F.3d at 217 (citing App. 55). 
28 Id. at 217-18 (citing App. at 47). 
29 Id. at 218. 
30 Id. (citing App. at 48). 
31 Id. at 222. 
32 Id. 
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an arbitrator’s interpretation of parties’ arbitration agreements, 
even if that interpretation seems implausible, or should courts 
overturn such interpretations when the arbitrators interpreted the 
agreement in an implausible manner, and thus exceeded their 
powers?33 
  
 A decision in this case likely will close the gap left by 
footnote 10 of Stolt-Nielsen and hopefully address once and for all 
whether an arbitrator can ever read a silent arbitration clause to 
authorize class arbitration. 
 
II. Notable Administrative Law Decision: FINRA v. 
Schwab 
 
 The Supreme Court’s seminal April 2011decision in 
AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion,34 in which it held that the 
FAA preempts California’s Discover Bank rule, which 
“classif[ied] most collective-arbitration waivers in consumer 
contracts as unconscionable,”35 confirmed the strong preemptive 
force of the FAA, and reduced consumers’ ability to challenge 
class action waivers as unconscionable under state law.  As a 
result, since AT&T Mobility, companies have been inserting class 
action waivers in their consumer agreements, and courts largely 
have been enforcing them.36   
                                                 
33 See Steve Vladeck, Argument recap: How much deference do 
arbitrators deserve under Stolt-Nielsen?, SCOTUSblog (Mar. 27, 2013), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/03/argument-recap-how-much-
deference-do-arbitrators-deserve-under-stolt-nielsen/. 
34 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).  For a detailed discussion of the case, see Jill I. 
Gross, Arbitration Case Law Update 2011, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 
2011, at 205 (Practising Law Institute 2011). 
35 AT&T Mobility, 131 S.Ct. at 1746. 
36 See, e.g., Muriithi v. Shuttle Express, Inc., 712 F.3d 173 (4th Cir. 2013); 
Kilgore v. Keybank, N.A., __ F.3d __, 2013 WL 1458876 (9th Cir. Apr. 
11, 2013); Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 691 F.3d 1224, 1226 (11th 
Cir. 2012). 
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 However, one question not addressed by AT&T Mobility is 
how courts should resolve challenges to class action waivers on the 
grounds that they violate a competing federal law.  Indeed, it is 
well-established that the mandate of the FAA is not absolute: it 
may be “overridden by a ‘contrary congressional command.’”37  
While the FAA preemption doctrine requires the broad 
displacement of state laws that conflict with the policies 
underlying the FAA, courts must turn to other doctrines when 
resolving conflicts between the FAA and other federal laws.38 
 
Last year’s chapter detailed the contention of one broker-
dealer, FINRA member Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. (“Schwab”), 
that the holding of AT&T Mobility applies in the securities context, 
and displaces conflicting FINRA rules, which are approved by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission.39  In October 2011, Schwab 
                                                 
37 CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012) (quoting 
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 
(1987)).  Courts have been very reluctant this past year to find such a 
“contrary congressional command” sufficient to overcome a class action 
waiver.  See, e.g., Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1054 (8th 
Cir. 2013) (enforcing a class action waiver in the Fair Labor Standards 
Act context and stating “our conclusion is consistent with all of the other 
courts of appeals that have considered this issue and concluded that 
arbitration agreements containing class waivers are enforceable in FLSA 
cases”). 
38 See, e.g., In the Matter of Eber, 687 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(affirming bankruptcy court’s denial of motion to compel arbitration on 
the grounds that the federal bankruptcy laws displaced the FAA); State of 
Wash. v. James River Ins. Co., 292 P.3d 118 (WA Sup. Ct. 2013) 
(declaring a mandatory arbitration clause in an insurance contract 
unenforceable under a state law that was shielded from FAA preemption 
under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1012(b)). 
39  Jill I. Gross, Arbitration Case Law Update 2012, in SECURITIES 
ARBITRATION 2012, at 233-34 (Practising Law Institute 2012) 
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amended its customer agreement to add a class action waiver to the 
arbitration clause.40   
 
In response, in early 2012, FINRA Enforcement brought a 
disciplinary action against Schwab for including the class action 
waiver.41  FINRA charged that requiring customers to waive their 
right to bring or participate in a class action violates NASD Rule 
3110(f)(4)(A) and (C), and its successor rules FINRA Rule 
2268(d)(1) and (3) (effective Dec. 5, 2011).  Those rules prohibit 
member firms from placing “any condition” in a pre-dispute 
arbitration agreement that “limits or contradicts the rules of any 
self-regulatory organization,” and “limits the ability of a party to 
file any claim in court permitted to be filed in court under the rules 
of the forums in which a claim may be filed under the agreement,” 
respectively.  FINRA argued that, because Rule 12204(d) of the 
FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes 
addresses the manner in which customers can bring and participate 
in class actions against member firms, the forum rules clearly 
permit class actions, and Schwab’s class action waiver contradicts 
Rule 12204.42 
 
On February 21, 2013, a FINRA hearing panel issued its 
decision, finding that Schwab’s actions in inserting the class action 
waiver did indeed violate FINRA rules, but that the FAA 
precluded FINRA from enforcing its rules against Schwab.43  That 
                                                 
40 SECURITIES ARBITRATION ALERT 2011-38 (Oct. 12, 2011) (reporting 
that Schwab inserted a new clause entitled “Waiver of Class Action or 
Representative Action” in its Customer Account Agreements). 
41 Complaint and Request for Expedited Hearing, Department of 
Enforcement v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., Disc. Proc. No. 
2011029760201, available at 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@enf/@ad/documents/ind
ustry/p125516.pdf (FINRA Office of Hearing Officers Feb. 1, 2012). 
42 Id. 
43 Hearing Panel Decision, Department of Enforcement v. Charles 
Schwab & Co., Inc., Disc. Proc. No. 2011029760201, available at 
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decision is currently on appeal to the National Adjudicatory 
Council and briefing will continue throughout the summer of 2013.   
 
I have argued that the hearing panel’s decision is wrong, 
and that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended by the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010 (Dodd-Frank),44 provides the “contrary congressional 
command” required by AT&T Mobility and CompuCredit to 
displace the FAA.45  In my view, unless reversed on appeal, the 
Hearing Panel’s decision deals a crippling blow to the authority of 
FINRA and the SEC to adopt arbitration rules that balance the 
benefits of arbitration with the need to protect investors. 
 
III. Notable federal court decisions 
A. Defenses to Arbitrability 
 Litigation about arbitration often results when one party to 
a purported arbitration agreement seeks to compel a reluctant party 
to arbitrate a dispute.  In response to the motion to compel, the 
reluctant party can raise several defenses to the arbitrability of the 
dispute, including a statutory prohibition, the absence of an 
enforceable arbitration agreement (due to contract law doctrines or, 
in FINRA arbitration, the claimant is not a “customer” of 
respondent), and waiver.  Discussed below are some recent federal 
court of appeals decisions interpreting these defenses. 
 
                                                                                                    
http://disciplinaryactions.finra.org/viewdocument.aspx?DocNB=33101 
(FINRA Office of Hearing Officers Feb. 21, 2103). 
44 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
45 See Barbara Black & Jill Gross, Investor Protection Meets the Federal 
Arbitration Act, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 1 (2012).  
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1. A “contrary congressional command” 
 
 If a federal statute has explicitly declared that claims 
arising under it are non-arbitrable, then a court must deny a motion 
to compel arbitration of those claims.  Several federal statutory 
schemes establishing rights of action arising under them include 
nonarbitrability provisions, including the whistleblower provisions 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX).46 
  
 §806 of SOX adds protection for and gives a right of 
action to “whistleblowers” who report fraud at publicly-traded 
companies.47  In §922 of Dodd-Frank, Congress declared that pre-
dispute arbitration agreements purporting to require arbitration of 
SOX whistleblower claims are not enforceable.48  This past year, a 
federal district court applied this ban on arbitrating SOX 
whistleblower claims retroactively, thus precluding arbitration of 
whistleblower claims that arose even before Dodd-Frank’s 
enactment.49  This decision could be helpful to pre-2010 
whistleblowers from securities industry firms forced into 
arbitration. 
 
2. Was there an enforceable arbitration 
agreement? 
 
 Before a court will grant a motion to compel arbitration 
under the FAA, it must be satisfied that the disputing parties 
entered into a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement.  Thus, 
defenses to contracts generally can be raised in response to a 
motion to compel arbitration.  For example, this past year, the 
Fourth Circuit refused to enforce an arbitration agreement between 
home purchasers and a real estate development company due to 
                                                 
46 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
47 18 U.S.C. §1514A (2012). 
48 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e)(2) (2012).  
49 See Wong v. CKX, Inc., 890 F. Supp.2d 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
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lack of mutual consideration.50  Applying Maryland law, the Court 
of Appeals concluded that consideration for the underlying 
contract is not sufficient to constitute consideration for a stand-
alone contract, including an arbitration clause within that 
contract.51 
 
 However, even if parties did not directly enter into an 
arbitration agreement, they still may be able to compel arbitration 
of claims arising out of an arbitration agreement between 
signatories under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.  A 
nonsignatory can enforce an arbitration clause with a signatory: 
 
(1) when a signatory must rely on the terms of the written 
agreement in asserting its claims against the 
nonsignatory or the claims are ‘intimately founded in 
and intertwined with’ the underlying contract, and (2) 
when the signatory alleges substantially 
interdependent and concerted misconduct by the 
nonsignatory and another signatory and ‘the 
allegations of interdependent misconduct [are][ 
founded in or intimately connected with the 
obligations of the underlying agreement.’52   
 
In Kramer, a putative class action brought by purchasers and 
lessees of allegedly defective hybrid cars against Toyota, the 
manufacturer, Toyota attempted to compel arbitration of plaintiffs’ 
claims based on an arbitration agreement in the purchase 
                                                 
50 See Noohi v. Toll Bros., Inc., 708 F.3d 599 (4h Cir. 2013). 
51 Id. at 609. 
52 See Kramer v. Toyota Motor Corp., 705 F.3d 1122, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 
2013) (internal citations omitted); see also Escobal v. Celebration Cruise 
Operator, Inc., 482 Fed. Appx. 475, 476 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Escobal's 
claim against Cruise Line is inextricably intertwined with his claims 
against the contract signatory Celebration Cruise Operator. Thus, the 
district court properly applied equitable estoppel in requiring Escobal to 
arbitrate his claim against Cruise Line.”).  
 15 
agreements between the plaintiffs and car dealerships.  The Ninth 
Circuit refused to compel arbitration under the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel, finding that plaintiffs’ claims were not 
“intimately founded in and intertwined with” the plaintiffs’ 
purchase agreements, nor were their allegations that Toyota and 
the dealerships engaged in a pattern of denial or concealment of 
the alleged defects “inextricably bound up with the obligations” in 
the purchase agreements.53 
 
 Courts of Appeal have likewise rejected several other 
attempts by nonsignatories to enforce arbitration agreements 
against signatories this past year, on both equitable estoppel54 and 
third-party beneficiary55 theories.  These cases signal a trend in 
courts to reject arbitration of claims other than between or among 
signatories to a written arbitration agreement.  This trend may have 
implications for investors who, for example, have arbitration 
agreements with a custodial broker-dealer who is a FINRA 
member with few duties to customers but not necessarily with the 
investment adviser who controls the account.  The investment 
adviser is a third-party beneficiary of the arbitration agreement 
between the broker-dealer and the investor, but courts may not 
permit the investor to compel arbitration with the adviser if it 
applies the third-party beneficiary doctrine narrowly or not at all. 
  
                                                 
53 Kramer, 705 F.3d at 1129-33. 
54 See, e.g., Baldwin v. Cavett, 502 Fed. Appx 350, 356 (5th Cir. 2012); In 
re Wholesale Grocery Prod. Antitrust Litig., 707 F.3d 917, 922-23 (8th 
Cir. 2013); Branch v. Ottinger, 477 Fed. Appx. 718, 720 (11th Cir. 2012). 
55 If a nonsignatory can demonstrate it is a third-party beneficiary of an 
arbitration agreement, it can enforce that agreement against signatories.  
See Fundamental Admin. Servs., LLC v. Patton, Civ. No. 12-2014, 2012 
WL 5992259, *3 (10th Cir. Dec. 3, 2012). 
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3. Who is a “customer” under FINRA Rule 
12200? 
 
In a FINRA customer-initiated arbitration, in the absence 
of a pre-dispute arbitration clause, respondents may resist 
arbitration on the ground that the claimant is not a “customer” of 
the FINRA member firm within the meaning of FINRA Code of 
Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes Rule 12200.  That 
rule provides that a FINRA member firm must arbitrate a claim if 
“requested by a customer,” “[t]he dispute is between a customer 
and a member or associated person of a member; and [t]he dispute 
arises in connection with the business activities of the member or 
the associated person . . . .”56 
 
 Courts continue to interpret Rule 12200 in the context of 
respondents’ motions for declaratory and/or injunctive relief on the 
grounds that the claimant is not a “customer” within the meaning 
of the rule.  The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals alone has issued 
at least four decisions on this issue in the past year.   
 
 One case construed the term “associated person” for 
purposes of Rule 12200.57  Specifically, it addressed the “novel 
question” of “[w]hether a person who is not in a contractual 
relationship with a member firm nevertheless can be an ‘associated 
person’ of that firm for purposes of FINRA arbitration.”58  In that 
case, investors brought arbitration claims against their financial 
advisor George Gilbert, Gilbert’s current investment firm, 
Waterford Investment Services, Inc. (Waterford), and his prior 
firm, Community Bankers Securities, LLC (CBS).59  During the 
                                                 
56 FINRA R. 12200. 
57 See Waterford Inv. Serv., Inc. v. Bosco, 682 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2012). 
58 Id. at 354. 
59 Notably, the district court found that Waterford was a “’mere 
continuation’ of CBS.”  Waterford Inv. Servs., Inc. v. Bosco, 2011 WL 
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time period of the relevant transactions (which turned out to be a 
Ponzi scheme), Gilbert sold securities through CBS, but not 
Waterford, under an “Independent Associate Agreement.”   
 
 To avoid arbitration with the investors, Waterford sought a 
declaratory judgment in federal district court that the investors 
were not its customers under Rule 12200.  The parties did not 
dispute that the investor claimants were customers of Gilbert and 
that their claims arose out of Gilbert’s business activities.  Because 
a member firm must arbitrate the claims of its associated person’s 
customers, the only issue was whether Gilbert was an associated 
person of Waterford during the relevant time period.  The court 
looked to FINRA Rule 12100(r), which defined a “person 
associated with a member” as “a natural person engaged in the 
investment banking or securities business who is directly or 
indirectly controlling or controlled by a member.” Ultimately, by 
examining the close relationship between CBS and Waterford at 
the relevant time, including the facts that they shared many 
officers, directors and employees, and shared office space and 
trading resources, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district 
court’s finding that Waterford had “the power and ability to 
exercise power” over Gilbert.60  Thus, Gilbert was an associated 
person of Waterford at the time of the relevant transactions and 
Waterford was required to arbitrate the investors’ claims. 
 
 Another case interpreted the definition of “customer” in 
the context of an issuer of auction rate securities suing the financial 
institutions that advised the issuer and underwrote those issuances.  
In January 2013, the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court's 
refusal to enjoin the arbitration claims of a not-for-profit healthcare 
organization that had issued auction rate securities against UBS 
                                                                                                    
3820723 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2011), aff'd, 682 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(quotation omitted). 
60 Waterford, 682 F.3d at 354 (internal citations omitted). 
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Financial Services, Inc. and Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., both 
of which had advised it in connection with the issuance.61  UBS 
and Citi argued that the claimant was not its “customer” under 
Rule 12200 because its claims “did not relate to a brokerage 
account or investment relationship with UBS or Citi.”62 
 
 The Court of Appeals rejected that narrow definition, 
instead defining the term “customer” as “one, not a broker or 
dealer, who purchases commodities or services from a FINRA 
member in the course of the member's business activities insofar as 
those activities are regulated by FINRA—namely investment 
banking and securities business activities.”63  Because UBS and 
Citi had provided multiple services to Carilion in connection with 
the securities offering and received payment from Carilion for 
those services, the court had “little difficulty concluding that 
Carilion is such a ‘customer.’”64  
 
 In contrast, two subsequent Fourth Circuit cases applied 
the Carilion definition of “customer” and ruled that the claimants 
were not customers of FINRA members.65  In Silverman, the 
circuit court concluded that investors were not “customers” of the 
principal distributor and underwriter of bond funds that they 
purchased through another broker-dealer.66  In Cary, the circuit 
                                                 
61 See UBS Financial Services, Inc. v. Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d 319 (4th 
Cir. 2013) 
62 Id. at 324 (citing Fleet Boston Robertson Stephens, Inc. v. Innovex, 
Inc., 264 F.3d 770 (8th Cir. 2001)).  
63 Id. at 327. 
64 Id.; see also UBS Financial Services Inc. v. West Virginia University 
Hospitals Inc., 660 F.3d 643 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that an issuer who 
purchases auction-facilitating services for its auction rate securities from 
a broker-dealer is a “customer” of that broker-dealer within the meaning 
of FINRA Rule 12200). 
65 Morgan Keegan & Co. Inc. v. Silverman, 706 F.3d 562 (4th Cir.  
2013); Raymond James Fin’l Serv., Inc. v. Cary, 709 F.3d 382 (4th Cir.  
2013). 
66 Silverman, 706 F.3d at 567-68. 
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court concluded that investors were not “customers” of Raymond 
James Financial Services when they purchased securities on the 
recommendation of an attorney who was not affiliated with 
Raymond James but merely was a “personal friend and business 
acquaintance” of a Raymond James broker.67 
 
 Similarly, an Eighth Circuit court rejected investors’ 
claims that they were “customers” of a broker-dealer, Berthel 
Fisher & Co., which had managed an offering of securities that 
were sold directly to the investors by other “selling” broker-
dealers.  The Court of Appeals concluded that, because Berthel 
Fisher or its associated persons had not provided investment or 
brokerage services directly to the investors, and the investors had 
no relationship with Berthel Fisher, the investors could not compel 
arbitration of their claims against that broker-dealer.68 
 
 These conflicting decisions demonstrate that courts 
struggle to come up with a coherent definition of “customer” under 
Rule 12200, leaving industry firms with a lack of clarity and 
predictability as to who might be able to compel arbitration of their 
disputes. 
 
4. Waiver 
 
 Litigants seeking to avoid arbitration have sometimes been 
successful asserting the defense of waiver to a motion to compel 
arbitration.  This is a claim that one party to an arbitration clause 
has waived its right to arbitrate based on conduct in parallel 
litigation.  While the waiver test varies slightly among the federal 
circuits, courts typically consider factors such as: (1) the time 
elapsed from commencement of litigation to the request for 
arbitration; (2) the amount and nature of litigation, including 
                                                 
67 Cary, 709 F.3d at 386. 
68 Berthel Fisher & Co. Fin’l Serv., Inc., 695 F.3d 749 (8th Cir. 2012). 
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substantive motions and discovery; and (3) prejudice to the party 
opposing arbitration.69   
 
 This past year, the Eleventh Circuit held that Wells Fargo 
Bank, N.A. (for itself and its predecessor Wachovia Bank, N.A.) 
waived its right to compel arbitration of class action claims 
alleging that it charged its checking account customers unlawful 
overdraft fees.70  In the proceedings below, Wells Fargo had 
declined two invitations by the district court to move to compel 
arbitration.  Soon after the Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T 
Mobility, however, Wells Fargo “reversed course” and moved to 
compel arbitration of plaintiffs’ claims on an individual basis, but 
the district court denied the motion on the grounds of waiver.71  
 
 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that Wells 
Fargo’s conduct met its two-part waiver test:  it had acted 
inconsistently with its arbitration right by “substantially invok[ing] 
the litigation machinery prior to demanding arbitration,” and its 
actions “in some way prejudiced the other party.”72 In assessing 
prejudice, the circuit court considered the substantial discovery 
that the parties already had conducted in the litigation, and at 
substantial cost.73 
 
 The Court of Appeals also rejected Wells Fargo’s 
argument that it would have been futile to move to compel 
arbitration initially on the grounds that the relevant arbitration 
                                                 
69 See, e.g., Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, P.A. v. NCR Corp., 
376 Fed. Appx. 70, 71 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP 
v. Auffenberg, 646 F.3d 919, 924 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“By this opinion we 
alert the bar in this Circuit that failure to invoke arbitration at the first 
available opportunity will presumptively extinguish a client's ability later 
to opt for arbitration.”). 
70 Garcia v. Wachovia Corp., 699 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir. 2012). 
71 Id. at 1275. 
72 Id. at 1277 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
73 Id. at 1279. 
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clause had a class action waiver that arguably was unenforceable 
pre-AT&T Mobility.  Instead, the Court of Appeals found that 
AT&T Mobility “established no new law” and Wells Fargo could 
have made the same arguments that AT&T successfully made in 
its case.74   
 
 This decision signals that financial services institutions 
that have allowed class actions to go forward in the past on the 
assumption that class action waivers rendered their arbitration 
clauses unenforceable likely will be found to have waived their 
right to compel arbitration of those class claims on an individual 
basis. 
 
B. Vacatur of Awards 
 
 Since the Court’s 2008 decision in Hall Street Assoc., 
L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008), it is well-established 
that FAA §10(a) provides the sole grounds for vacating an 
arbitration award under federal law.  Appellate courts have 
continued to interpret the scope of those grounds over the past 
year. 
 
1. Procured by fraud 
 
 In a decision important to the career of a well-known 
securities arbitration expert, Dr. Craig McCann, the Fifth Circuit 
reversed a district court’s decision to vacate a FINRA arbitration 
award on the ground that, inter alia, it was procured by fraud 
within the meaning of FAA §10(a)(1).75  The district court had 
concluded that Dr. McCann, who had testified as an expert at the 
arbitration hearing, “knowingly testified to incorrect numbers, and 
                                                 
74 Id. at 1275, 1279-80. 
75 Morgan Keegan & Co., Inc. v. Garrett, 495 Fed. Appx. 443 (5th Cir. 
2012). 
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‘the [arbitration] panel based its damages calculations on [Dr. 
McCann’s knowingly false testimony.”76 
 
 The Court of Appeals concluded that the district court 
erred in vacating the award under §10(a)(1).  The Court noted that 
Dr. McCann had provided revised calculations to Morgan 
Keegan’s lawyers in the context of another arbitration before the 
issuance of the award in Garrett.  In addition, Dr. McCann’s 
calculations relied on Morgan Keegan’s own internal pricing 
numbers.  Had Morgan Keegan performed any due diligence, the 
appellate court concluded, it could have discovered any alleged 
fraud on its own, and thus could not meet its burden of proof on 
the three-prong test for vacatur on this ground.77  Thus, the Court 
of Appeals “expressly vacate[d] the finding that Dr. McCann 
committed fraud” and reinstated the arbitration award. 78 
 
2. Evident Partiality 
 Losing parties to arbitration awards can also seek vacatur 
pursuant to FAA § 10(a)(2) if they show “evident partiality” in the 
arbitrators.  Courts have had difficulty developing a test for 
“evident partiality,” since the Supreme Court’s only decision under 
that subsection is the 45-year old decision in Commonwealth 
Coatings v. Continental Casualty Co.,79 and that case yielded 
plurality and concurring opinions that are difficult to synthesize.  
Most circuits follow the test set forth by the Second Circuit in 
Morelite Constr. v. New York City Dist. Council Carpenters Ben. 
Funds,80 where the court held that “evident partiality” is “where a 
                                                 
76 Id. at 445 (citing district court opinion). 
77 Id. at 447. 
78 Id. at 447-48.   
79 393 U.S. 145 (1968). 
80 748 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1984).  
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reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was 
partial to one party to the arbitration.” 81 
 
 This past year, the Third Circuit adopted the Second 
Circuit’s test.82  Under that test, the circuit court in Freeman 
concluded that an arbitrator who was formerly a judge did not 
demonstrate “evident partiality” by failing to disclose she: (1) 
received small donations to her former judicial campaign from the 
minority owner of the prevailing party in the arbitration and some 
of its top-level employees; and (2) taught a seminar on labor law 
with the prevailing party’s senior employment attorney.83 
 
 In contrast, the Sixth Circuit vacated an award on the 
ground of evident partiality under the same test in an arbitration 
arising out a contract between an artist and an art dealer.84  There, 
the parties agreed to a tri-partite panel, and the neutral arbitrator 
selected by the party-appointed arbitrator was Mark Kowalsky.  
After almost five years and 50 hearing days of the arbitration, 
Kowalsky disclosed to the artist-claimant that the dealer-
respondent as well as its party-appointed arbitrator had both 
retained Kowalsky’s law firm for other lucrative litigation matters.  
Subsequent procedural and substantive rulings by Kowalsky in the 
arbitration all favored the respondent, including the final award.85  
The circuit court concluded that “[claimant] established a 
                                                 
81 Id. at 83; see also NGC Network Asia, LLC v. PAC Pacific Group 
Intern., Inc., No. 12-00967, 2013 WL 490935 (2d Cir. Feb. 11, 2013) 
(affirming denial of motion to vacate on grounds of, inter alia, evident 
partiality, where arbitrator had disclosed at time of his selection that his 
law firm had a business relationship with a company that had an indirect, 
non-controlling interest in the losing party to the arbitration). 
82 See Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 252-53 
(3d Cir.  2013). 
83 Id. at 254-56; see also Morgan Keegan & Co., Inc. v. Grant, 497 Fed. 
Appx. 715 (9th Cir. 2012) (no evident partiality from fact that arbitrator 
sometimes represented investors against brokers in private practice). 
84 Thomas Kinkade Co. v. White, 711 F.3d 719 (6th Cir. 2013). 
85 Id. at 720-23. 
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convergence of undisputed facts that, considered together, show a 
motive for Kowalsky to favor the Whites and multiple, concrete 
actions in which he appeared actually to favor them.”86  The 
appellate court’s opinion harshly criticized Kowalsky for his 
actions, declaring that “[a] party who pays a neutral arbitrator to 
prepare for, and then sit through, nearly 50 days of hearing over a 
five-year period, deserves better treatment than this.”87 
 
3. Exceeding powers 
 
 Another ground of vacatur under the FAA is that the 
arbitrators exceeded their powers within the meaning of §10(a)(4).  
Late last year, a Third Circuit court reversed a district court’s 
vacatur of a FINRA award on this ground.88  There, a financial 
advisor sought to overturn an award to pay back her former 
employer, Merrill Lynch, amounts based on a promissory note she 
signed when she started employment.  The district court vacated 
the award on the ground that the arbitrators “irrationally 
constru[ed] the parties’ arrangements” and the impact on those 
arrangements of a settlement of an ERISA action that the broker 
had brought against Merrill Lynch.89    
 
 The Court of Appeals held that, to prove arbitrators 
exceeded their powers under §10(a)(4), a losing party must show 
that the arbitrators “fashion[ed] an award that cannot ‘be rationally 
derived from the agreement between the parties or from the 
parties’ submissions to the arbitrators’ or when the terms of the 
arbitration award itself ‘are completely irrational.’”90  The court 
found that there was some support in the record for the arbitrators’ 
                                                 
86 Id. at 724. 
87 Id. at 725. 
88 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Schwarzfelder, 496 
Fed. Appx. 227 (3d Cir. 2012). 
89 Id. at 230-31. 
90 Id. at 231-32. 
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interpretation of the financial arrangements.  Moreover, even if 
that interpretation is “open to criticism, ‘[a court] may not overrule 
an arbitrator simply because [the court] disagree[s].’”91  Because 
the Third Circuit concluded that the panel’s decision “can be 
rationally derived from the parties’ agreements and submissions to 
the panel,” it did not exceed its powers. 92 
 
 In the Garrett case discussed above in section III.B.1., the 
Fifth Circuit also reversed the district court’s vacatur of the award 
on the ground that the panel had exceeded its powers under FAA 
§10(a)(4) by arbitrating derivative claims and claims brought by 
claimants who were not “customers” of Morgan Keegan.  The 
Fifth Circuit ruled that, because a FINRA panel has the power 
under FINRA Rule 12409 to “interpret and determine the 
applicability of all provisions under the [FINRA Customer] Code,” 
the arbitrators’ decision to arbitrate those claims could not have 
exceeded its powers.93   
 
 Finally, two state courts in the past year reminded FINRA 
parties that arbitrators do not exceed their powers by awarding 
attorney’s fees because FINRA rules provide FINRA arbitrators 
with the authority to award attorney’s fees under applicable law.94  
                                                 
91 Id. at 233 (citations omitted). 
92 Id. 
93 Garrett, 495 Fed. Appx. at 448-49.  
94 See Kaplan v. Shanahan, 985 N.E.2d 413 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013) 
(unpub.) (holding that FINRA arbitrators did not exceed their authority 
by awarding attorney’s fees because FINRA Dispute Resolution 
Arbitrators’ Guide provides that “attorney’s fees are allowed when the 
contract includes a clause that provides for the fees and the [sic] all of the 
parties request or agree to such fees, as was the case in this matter”); Bear 
Stearns & Co., Inc. v. Intern. Capital & Management Co. LLC, 952 
N.Y.S.2d 106, 107-08 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (holding that FINRA panel 
did not exceed its powers by awarding attorney’s fees to respondent 
brokerage firm and its affiliates when claimant sought attorney’s fees in 
its pleadings, agreed to arbitration pursuant to FINRA rules, which 
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These decisions collectively reflect that long-standing law that 
arbitrators have broad powers to award legal and equitable relief, 
as long as the parties’ arbitration agreement vests such power in 
the arbitrators. 
   
4. Manifest Disregard of the Law 
 
 Since the Supreme Court’s holding in Hall St. Assoc., 
L.L.C.  v. Mattel, Inc.95 that parties to an arbitration agreement 
cannot contractually expand the judicial grounds of review of an 
award under the FAA, the circuit courts have split on whether an 
arbitration panel’s “manifest disregard of the law” is a valid 
ground to vacate an arbitration award.  The Supreme Court 
expressly declined to resolve this split in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.96  The circuit split continues, as follows: 
 
 The Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits 
acknowledge the continued vitality of the “manifest 
disregard” ground of vacatur.97 
                                                                                                    
specifically authorize an award of attorney’s fees, and failed to object to 
respondents’ request for fees). 
95 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
96 559 U.S. 662, 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1768 n.3 (2010). 
97 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 94 (2d 
Cir. 2008), vacated on other grounds, 559 U.S. 662 (2010); Wachovia 
Securities, LLC v. Brand, 671 F.3d 472, 482 (4th Cir. 2012) (“Although 
we find that manifest disregard continues to exist as either an independent 
ground for review or as a judicial gloss, we need not decide which of the 
two it is because Wachovia’s claim fails under both”); Coffee Beanery, 
Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., 300 Fed. Appx. 415, 419 (6th Cir. 2008); Affymax, 
Inc. v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 660 F.3d 281, 285 
(7th Cir. 2011) (recognizing “manifest disregard” as a ground to vacate 
but only for an “award that directs the parties to violate the legal rights of 
third persons who did not consent to the arbitration”); Comedy Club, Inc. 
v.  Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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 The Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have expressly 
ruled that manifest disregard is no longer a valid vacatur 
ground.98  
 The First and D.C. Circuits have addressed “manifest 
disregard” subsequent to Hall Street, but only in dicta.99 
 The Third and Tenth Circuits have expressly declined to 
address the issue.100   
 
 For those courts that still recognize this ground of vacatur, 
they often note that it is virtually impossible to determine whether 
the panel manifestly disregarded the law in the absence of a 
reasoned or explained award.101  This fact is particularly relevant 
to FINRA arbitration, because parties have the right to jointly 
request an explained award under FINRA Rule 12904(g) and 
13904(g).  In Murray, the Sixth Circuit noted that, because 
claimant never sought an explained award, “[h]e therefore has no 
                                                 
98 See Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 352 (5th 
Cir. 2009); Medicine Shoppe Intern., Inc. v. Turner Investments, Inc., 614 
F.3d 485 (8th Cir. 2010); Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313, 
1324 (11th Cir. 2010).   
99 See Kashner Davidson Secs. Corp. v. Mscisz, 601 F.3d 19, 21 (1st Cir. 
2010) (acknowledging that the circuit has “not squarely determined 
whether our manifest disregard case law can be reconciled with Hall 
Street”); Affinity Fin. Corp. v. AARP Fin., Inc., 468 Fed. Appx, 4, 5 
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (“assuming without deciding” that manifest disregard 
standard still exists after Hall St.). 
100 See Rite Aid New Jersey, Inc. v. United Food Commercial Workers 
Union, Local 1360, 449 Fed. Appx. 126, 129 (3d Cir. 2011) (assuming 
without deciding that the manifest disregard standard survived Hall 
Street); Abbott v. Law Office of Patrick J. Mulligan, 440 Fed. Appx. 612, 
620 (10th Cir. 2011) (“in the absence of firm guidance from the Supreme 
Court, we decline to decide whether the manifest disregard standard 
should be entirely jettisoned”).  
101 See Murray v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., No. 11-4355, 2013 WL 
106826, *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 10, 2013). 
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one but himself to blame for our inability to assess his manifest-
disregard argument.”102 
 
IV. Notable State Court Decisions 
 
 Because the state courts, like the federal courts, also 
continue to publish decisions under the FAA at a rapid rate, I could 
not even begin to cover important state court decisions in the 
arbitration law area.  However, one recent decision caught my eye, 
as it could mean trouble for FINRA arbitration if other 
jurisdictions adopt its reasoning. 
 
 In April 2013, a Tennessee appellate court refused to 
enforce a pre-dispute arbitration clause in a brokerage firm’s 
account agreement with a customer on the grounds that the 
customer did not sign the arbitration agreement, and, in any event, 
it was unconscionable under Tennessee law.103  The court also 
affirmed the trial court’s finding that the customer was 
fraudulently induced to enter into the customer agreement which 
contained the arbitration clause.104 
 
 In Webb, plaintiff Franda Webb sued the broker-dealer 
affiliate of her bank in circuit court in Knox County, Tennessee, 
alleging it unsuitably recommended she use funds set aside for the 
special educational needs of her severely disabled son to purchase 
                                                 
102 Id. at *3.  Of course, the court glosses over the fact that it is virtually 
impossible to get both parties to agree to jointly request an explained 
award.   
103 See Webb v. First Tenn. Brokerage, Inc., No. E2012–00934–COA–
R3–CV, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 276, *47-52 (Apr. 23, 2013).  Because 
the arbitration clause on its face did not require arbitration of disputes 
between the customer and an individual account representative, only with 
the firm itself, the firm’s associated person could not compel arbitration 
of the dispute with Ms. Webb.  Id. at *12-18 (quoting lower court’s 
order). 
104 Id. at *53-54. 
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Lehman Brothers bonds. She alleged she was pressured to 
purchase $300,000 of the bonds (which were rendered largely 
worthless when Lehman filed for bankruptcy later that year) the 
same day as the recommendation, as she was told they were a 
“one-day opportunity.”105  She had little time to review the account 
application to open the new brokerage account (the funds were in 
her bank account).  She testified that she was not asked to sign an 
account agreement (which contained an arbitration clause 
designating FINRA as the forum) and had never seen or discussed 
an arbitration agreement with the broker.106  Other facts that 
emerged in the hearing on the broker’s motion to compel 
arbitration suggest that no arbitration agreement was found in her 
customer file at the brokerage firm.107 
 
 The appellate court agreed with the district court’s 
conclusions that the firm did not prove that Ms. Webb signed the 
arbitration agreement,108 and, even if she had, it was unenforceable 
as an unconscionable contract of adhesion.109  The appellate court 
agreed with the trial court that the following factors are relevant to 
a determination of unconscionability of this agreement under 
Tennessee law: 
 The arbitration clause was part of a contract of adhesion; 
 The arbitration clause was on page 11 of a 14-page 
account agreement; 
 The arbitration procedures were not set forth in a separate 
stand-alone document; 
 The arbitration clause did not tell the customer how to 
initiate arbitration and was misleading; 
 Plaintiff was pressured to sign the paperwork quickly; 
                                                 
105 Id.  at *4. 
106 Id. at *5-7. 
107 Id. at *9-11. 
108 Id. at *50-52. 
109 Id. at *47-50. 
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 The jury trial waiver language was printed in the same font 
size, type and color as the rest of the agreement; 
 The likely arbitration fees would be “oppressive.”110 
 
The appellate court also noted that Ms. Webb claimed she was 
fraudulently induced into signing the account agreement, and, 
under Tennessee law, fraudulent inducement claims are not 
arbitrable.111   
 
 Most courts that have previously considered similar 
challenges to arbitration agreements in broker-dealers’ customer 
agreements have rejected claims of unconscionability in part 
because the language and formatting of pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses in FINRA member firms’ customer agreements is 
prescribed by FINRA Rule 2268, and FINRA’s arbitration rules 
are subject to regulatory approval.  However, it appears that the 
arbitration clause that the brokerage firm used in this case did not 
meet the requirements of FINRA Rule 2268.  Thus, it is unlikely 
that this decision will lead to wide-scale invalidation of arbitration 
clauses in customer agreements.  
 
 Finally, the Florida Supreme Court answered a question 
“of great public importance” certified to it from a lower court 
regarding the applicability of statutes of limitation in securities 
arbitration.112 The Supreme Court of Florida quashed that holding, 
and concluded that statutes of limitation do apply in arbitration, 
                                                 
110 Id. at *20-27. 
111 Id. at *47. 
112 Raymond James Financial Services, Inc. v. Phillips, __ So.3d __, 2011 
WL 5555691 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2011) (holding Florida statutes 
of limitation did not apply to FINRA arbitration, but certifying question 
to Florida high court). 
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reasoning that an arbitration is a “civil action or proceeding” 
within the meaning of the statute.113 
                                                 
113 Raymond James Financial Services, Inc. v. Phillips, 2013 WL 
2096252 (Sup. Ct. Fla. May 16, 2013). 
